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To switch or not to switch, that is the question . . .[12]
1 The MHP
The Monty Hall Problem is often called paradox. The layman, trapped by
the alleged symmetry between two unrevealed doors, readily overlooks the
advantage of the switching action. This is not surprising as even the great
mathematical minds were not immune to fallacies of the symmetry. Leibniz
believed that “with two dice it is as feasible to throw a total 12 points as to
throw a total 11, as either one can only be achieved in one way” [11]. Erdo˝s
was reluctant in admitting utility of switching the doors in the MHP [7].
In the past twenty years the Monty Hall paradox made its way from the
pages of popular magazines to numerous introductory texts on probability
theory [1, 6]. Dozens of references are found in Wikipedia, thousands more
on the Web [13]. YouTube broadcasts funny animations and academic expla-
nations. A comprehensive source for the MHP is the book by Rosenhouse [8]
which traces the history, analyzes some mathematical variations and points
to the literature from distinct areas of science.
Recently, Richard Gill from Leiden University devoted a series of publica-
tions to the MHP [3, 4, 5]. Upon due analysis of the Wikipedia struggle [14]
between simplists and conditionalists, who dispute about the question if a
rigorous solution does require the conditional probabilities, Gill condemned
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the academic explanations of the paradox as “classical example of solution
driven science”. A major focus of his criticism is that the unspecified proba-
bility distributions are commonly assumed uniform to make the problem well
posed and amenable for analysis by tools of the probability theory.
As a new line of thinking Gill suggested to view the MHP as a game in
which two actors, Host and Contestant, employ two-action decision strate-
gies. This is a very attractive approach, since no a priori assumptions on
the distribution of unknown factors are made, rather the randomness is in-
troduced as a feature of the game-theoretic solution. In particular, Contes-
tant’s strategy “choose a door uniformly at random, then switch” appears as
a mixed minimax strategy, which ensures the winning probability 2/3, equal
to the value of the zero-sum game.
In this paper we elaborate details of the game-theoretic approach. Our
main point is that the fundamental principle of eliminating the dominated
strategies provides a convincing explanation of the advantage of the switching
action to the man from the street, as compared with the more sophisticated
arguments based on decision trees, conditional probabilities and Bayes’ the-
orem. Every Contestant’s policy “choose door Y and stay with it” is out-
performed by a policy “choose door Y ′ 6= Y then switch”, no matter what
Host does. Once the man from the street adopts strategic thinking and real-
izes that there is a two-step action, the comparison of alternatives becomes
obvious and, moreover, free of any probability considerations.
To conceive another twist in the switch-versus-notswitch dilemma let us
take in this introduction a simplistic approach, that is disregard which par-
ticular door is revealed by Host after Contestant’s choice. Let X denote the
door hiding the car. Consider three Contestant’s strategies:
A : choose door 1, do not switch,
B : choose door 1 then switch,
C : choose door 2 then switch.
Strategy A wins if X = 1, while strategy B wins if X ∈ {2, 3}, so they
cannot win simultaneously. The odds 1 : 2 are against A if the values of X
are assumed equally likely. More generally, the statistical reasoning assigns
probabilities to the values of X and leads to the familiar conclusion that B
should be preferred to A under the condition that the probability of X = 1 is
less than the probability ofX ∈ {2, 3}. Nothing new so far, but now including
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C into the consideration we observe that strategy C wins for X ∈ {1, 3}, so
if A wins then C wins too, and there is a situation when C wins while A
fails. Thus strategy C is not worse than A, and it is strictly better if door 3
sometimes hides the car. This provides a universal ground to avoid A, and
for similar reason the other strategies which do not switch.
2 The zero-sum game
Regarding the rules of the Monty Hall show, we shall follow the conventions
which Rosenhouse [8] calls canonical or classic, with the only amendment
that Host has the freedom to choose a door hiding the car. A natural model
to start with is a pure competition of the actors. Whether it is realistic or
not, this instance answers the question what Contestant can achieve under
the least favorable circumstances.
The abstraction of the mathematical Game Theory is based on a number
of concepts such as strategy, payoff and common knowledge. For these and
basic propositions used below we refer to the online tutorial by Ferguson [2].
2.1 Strategies and the payoff matrix
To introduce formally the possible actions of actors and the rules it will be
convenient to label the doors 1, 2, 3 in the left-to-right order. The game in
extensive form has four moves:
(i) Host chooses a door X out of 1, 2, 3 to hide the car. The choice is kept
in secret.
(ii) Contestant picks a door Y out of 1, 2, 3 and announces her choice. Now
both actors know Y , and they label the doors distinct from Y Left and
Right in the left-to-right order.
(iii) If Y = X , so the choice of Contestant fell on the door with the car,
Host chooses door Z to reveal from Left and Right doors. In the event
of mismatch, Y 6= X , Host reveals the remaining door Z (distinct from
X and Y ), which is either Left or Right depending on X, Y .
(iv) Contestant observes the revealed door Z and makes a final decision:
she can choose between Switch and Notswitch from Y to another un-
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revealed door (so distinct from Y and Z). Contestant wins if the final
choice yields X and loses otherwise.
Host’s action on step (iii), when he has some freedom, may depend on the
initial Contestant’s choice Y . Contestant’s final action in (iv) depends on
both Y and Z. The rules of the game is a common knowledge.
To put the game in the matrix form we label the admissible pure strategies
of the actors. The pure strategies of Host are
1L, 1R, 2L, 2R, 3L, 3R.
For instance, according to strategy 2L the car is hidden behind door X = 2,
then if the outcome of (ii) is Y = 2, Host will reveal Left door (which is door
1); if Y = 1 Host will reveal Right door (which is door 3); and if Y = 3 Host
will reveal Left door (which is door 1).
The pure strategies of Contestant are
1SS, 1SN, 1NS, 1NN, 2SS, 2SN, 2NS, 2NN, 3SS, 3SN, 3NS, 3NN.
The first symbol is a value of Y , while SS, SN, NS, SS encode how Con-
testant’s second action depends on Y and Left/Right door opened. For
instance, 1NS means that door Y = 1 is initially chosen, then Contestant
plays Notswitch if Host reveals Left door; and she plays Switch if Host reveals
Right door.
The game is played as if Host and Contestant have chosen their two-step
pure strategies before the Monty Hall show starts. For this purpose they may
ask friends for advice, or employ random devices like spinning a roulette or
rolling dice. After the choices are made the actors simply follow their plans.
The choices could be communicated to a referee who announces the then
pre-determined outcome of the game. For example, if Contestant and Host
chose profile (2SN, 1R) the show proceeds as follows:
(i) Host hides the car behind door 1.
(ii) Contestant picks door 2, thus the actors label door 1 as Left and door
3 as Right.
(iii) Host observes a mismatch hence he reveals the remaining door 3.
(iv) Contestant observes opened door 3, which is Right, hence she plays
Notswitch - meaning that she stays with door 2 (and loses).
The zero-sum game is assumed to have two distinguishable outcomes –
Contestant either wins the car (payoff 1) or not (payoff 0). In the zero-
sum game the payoff of one actor is the negative of the payoff of another:
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Contestant is willing to win the car while Host aims to avoid this. All pos-
sible outcomes of the game are summarized in matrix C with the payoffs of
Contestant:
1L 1R 2L 2R 3L 3R
1SS 0 0 1 1 1 1
1SN 0 1 0 0 1 1
1NS 1 0 1 1 0 0
1NN 1 1 0 0 0 0
2SS 1 1 0 0 1 1
2SN 0 0 0 1 1 1
2NS 1 1 1 0 0 0
2NN 0 0 1 1 0 0
3SS 1 1 1 1 0 0
3SN 0 0 1 1 0 1
3NS 1 1 0 0 1 0
3NN 0 0 0 0 1 1
Following the paradigm of the zero-sum games, we shall look for minimax
solutions. Quick inspection of C shows that there are no saddle points in
pure strategies. We turn therefore to randomized, or mixed strategies. A
mixed strategy of Contestant is a row vector P of twelve probabilities that
are assigned to her pure strategies. Similarly, a mixed strategy of Host is a
row vector Q with six components. When profile (P ,Q) is played by the
actors, the expected payoff of Contestant, equal to the winning probabil-
ity, is computed by the matrix multiplication as PCQT , where T denotes
transposition. We stress that this way to compute the winning probabil-
ity presumes that actors’ choices of pure strategies are independent random
variables, which may be simulated by their private randomization devices.
2.2 The dominance
The search of solution is largely facilitated by a simple reduction process
based on the idea of dominance. Actor’s strategy B is said to be dominated
by strategy A if anything the actor can achieve using strategy B can be
achieved at least as well using A (that dominates B), no matter what the
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opponent does. Contestant is willing to maximize her payoff, hence she will
have no disadvantage by excluding the dominated strategies.
The principle of eliminating the dominated strategies is a theorem which
asserts that removal of dominated rows (or columns) does not affect the value
of the game. This enables us to reduce the game matrix by noticing that 1SS
dominates 2SN and 2NN
1SS 0 0 1 1 1 1
2SN 0 0 0 1 1 1
2NN 0 0 1 1 0 0
and that 3SS dominates 2NS
3SS 1 1 1 1 0 0
2NS 1 1 1 0 0 0
Similarly, all YNS, YNN and Y SN strategies are dominated for Y = 1, 2, 3.
After the row elimination the original game matrix C is reduced to a smaller
matrix
1L 1R 2L 2R 3L 3R
1SS 0 0 1 1 1 1
2SS 1 1 0 0 1 1
3SS 1 1 1 1 0 0
Note that the strategies involving Nonswitch action are all gone!
Continuing the reduction process, we observe that columnsXR andXL of
the reduced matrix are identical for X = 1, 2, 3, hence using the dominance,
now from the perspective of Host, the matrix can be further reduced to the
square matrix c
1L 2L 3L
1SS 0 1 1
2SS 1 0 1
3SS 1 1 0
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2.3 A minimax solution
Matrix c is the structure of payoffs in a game in which each actor has only
three pure strategies. The matrix has no saddle point, thus we turn to actors’
mixed strategies p, q which we write as vectors of size three.
One may guess and then check that if Contestant plays the mixed strat-
egy with probability vector p∗ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) then her probability of
win is 2/3 no matter what Host does. It is sufficient to check this for
three products p∗cqT , where q is one of the pure strategies of Contes-
tant (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1). Similarly, if Host plays mixed strategy q∗ =
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) then Contestant’s winning probability is 2/3 no matter what
she does. Contestant can guarantee winning chance 2/3, and Host can guar-
antee that the chance is not higher, therefore V = 2/3 is the minimax value
of the reduced game, i.e.
max
p
min
q
pcq = min
q
max
p
pcqT = p∗cq∗T = 2/3.
Instead of guessing the minimax probability vectors p∗ and q∗ we could
use various techniques applicable in our situation:
(a) The principle of indifference (see [2], Theorem 3.1) says that p∗ equal-
izes the outcome of the game in which Host uses any of pure strategies
that enter his minimax strategy with positive probability. This leads
to a system of linear equations for p∗ . Similarly for q∗ .
(b) Matrix c is a square nonsingular matrix, thus the approach based on
a general formula involving the inverse matrix can be tried (see [2],
Theorem 3.2).
(c) Subtracting constant matrix with all entries equal 1 reduces to the
game with diagonal matrix,
1L 2L 3L
1SS -1 0 0
2SS 0 -1 0
3SS 0 0 -1
for which a formula (see [2], Section 3.3 and Exercise 3.1) applies to
give
V − 1 =
(
1
−1
+
1
−1
+
1
−1
)
−1
= −
1
3
.
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(d) Observe that the square matrix is invariant under simultaneous per-
mutations of rows and columns (relabelling doors 1, 2, 3). Using the
principle of invariance (see [2], Theorem 3.4) it is easy to deduce that
p∗ is the uniform distribution on the set of three pure strategies in
game c. Similarly for q∗.
Going back to the original matrix C, we conclude that V = 2/3 is the
value of the game, and that the profile
P ∗ =
(
1
3
, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0
)
, Q∗
1,1,1 =
(
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0
)
is a solution to the game. The subscript of Q∗
1,1,1 will be explained soon.
According to this solution Host hides the car uniformly ar random, and
always reveals Left door when there is a freedom of second action. Contestant
selects door Y uniformly at random and always plays Switch.
A curious feature of this solution is that the preference of Host to Left
door sometimes gives strong confidence for Contestant’s decision. When Host
reveals Right door he signals that Left could not be opened, so Contestant
learns the location of the car and her Switch action bears no risk.
2.4 All minimax solutions
The reader might have noticed that strategy Q∗
1,1,1 disagrees with the com-
monly assumed Host’s behaviour, which corresponds to the uniform distri-
bution over all possible choices,
Q∗1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
=
(
1
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
)
.
According to Q∗1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
, Host hides the car uniformly at random, and for the
second choice between Left and Right (if there is a freedom) a fair coin is
flipped. This strategy is also minimax.
What are all minimax strategies? To answer this question we need to
trace back what was lost in the elimination process. By the column elimina-
tion we may remove any of two pure strategies XL, XR for each X = 1, 2, 3.
This yields eight minimax solutions Q
∗
0,0,0,Q
∗
0,0,1, . . . ,Q
∗
1,1,1, where in posi-
tion X = 1, 2, 3 of the index we write 0 if XL is never used, and we write 1 if
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XR is never used. Mixtures of these minimax strategies are again minimax,
and each such mixture can be uniquely represented in the form
Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 =
(
λ1
3
,
1− λ1
3
,
λ2
3
,
1− λ2
3
,
λ3
3
,
1− λ3
3
)
where 0 ≤ λX ≤ 1. Parameter λX has a transparent interpretation: this is
the conditional probability that Host will reveal Left door when the car is
hidden behind X and a match Y = X occurs.
The subclass of Host’s strategies with the second action independent of
the first given X = Y consists of strategies with equal probabilities λ1 =
λ2 = λ3. This mode of Host’s behavior is classified in [8] as Version Five of
the MHP. More general strategies Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 were considered in [9].
We need to further check if some minimax strategies of Contestant were
lost in the course of row elimination. The verification is necessary because
the deleted dominated strategies YNN, YNS and Y SN are only weakly dom-
inated, meaning that in some situations they perform equally well as the
strategies Y ′SS which dominate them. Examples of games can be given
showing that weakly dominated strategies may be minimax (see [2], Section
2.6, Exercise 9).
Recall that best response is a strategy optimal for an actor knowing which
particular strategy the opponent will use. Every minimax strategy P is nec-
essarily a best response to every minimax strategy of Host, yielding the ex-
pected payoff equal to the value PCQ∗Tλ1,λ2,λ3 = 2/3. Suppose for a time being
that minimax P assigns nonzero probability p > 0 to the pure strategy 2SN,
and let P ′ be a strategy obtained from P by removing the 2SN-component
but adding weight p to the 1SS-component. Recalling the pattern
1L 1R 2L 2R 3L 3R
1SS 0 0 1 1 1 1
2SN 0 0 0 1 1 1
2NN 0 0 1 1 0 0
we obtain
P ′CQ∗T1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
= PCQ∗T1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
+
p
6
> PCQ∗T1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
,
which means that P ′ strictly improves P in the combat against the minimax
strategy Q∗1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
. But this is a contradiction with the assumed minimax prop-
erty of P , thus 2SN cannot have positive probability in P . In the same way
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it is shown that 2NN does not enter P , and by symmetry among the doors
we conclude that none of the dominated strategies enters P . Thus nothing
was lost by the row elimination.
A crucial property of Q∗1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
we just used is that this strategy gives
nonzero probability to each of six pure strategies of Host. We shall call mixed
strategy Q fully supported if every pure strategy has a positive probability
in Q. In particular, Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 is fully supported if and only if 0 < λX < 1 for
X = 1, 2, 3, and minimaxity of any of these precludes minimaxity of every
(weakly) dominated strategy of Contestant.
To compare, let us examine strategy Q∗
1,1,1 which always reveals Left door
by a match. Pure strategy 1NS is a best response to Q
1,1,1, with the winning
chance 2/3, like for any other minimax strategy of Contestant. If Contestant
were ensured that Host will play Q∗
1,1,1 then she may, in principle, choose
1NS. However 1NS versus Q∗
1,1,1 would be an unstable profile, since Host
could drop Contestant’s winning chance by swapping to Q∗1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
.
We summarize our analysis of the zero-sum game in the following theorem:
Theorem Strategy P ∗, which is the uniform mixture of 1SS, 2SS, 3SS is
the unique minimax strategy of Contestant. Every strategy Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 with
0 ≤ λX ≤ 1, (X = 1, 2, 3) is a minimax strategy of Host. The value of the
game is V = 2/3.
We see that in the setting of zero-sum games any rational behaviour
of Host keeps Contestant away from employing strategies with Notswitch
action.
3 Nonzero-sum games
Could the strategies with Notswitch action be rational if the goals of actors
are not antagonistic? The answer is trivially “yes”. For suppose Host is
sympathetic to the extent that he is most happy when Contestant wins the
car. The profile (1NN, 1L) is then optimal for both actors: Host will “hide”
the car behind door 1, and Contestant will “guess” the prize there. Every
actor knows that unilateral stepping away from (1NN, 1L) cannot increase
private payoffs, thus the profile is an acceptable solution for everybody.
To treat the MHP within the framework of the general-sum game theory
we need to assume some Host’s payoff matrixH of the same dimensions asC.
Both matrices can be conveniently written as one bimatrix with the generic
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entry (c, h) specifying two payoffs for a given profile of pure strategies.
Thinking of the real-life Monty Hall show there is no obvious candidate
for H . With some degree of plausibility, if Host is antagonistic we may take
h ≡ −c (zero-sum game), if sympathetic h ≡ c, and if indifferent to the
outcome h ≡ 0. In fact, if the only Host’s concern is whether car won or not,
these three instances cover all essentially different possibilities.
A central solution concept for bimatrix games is Nash equilibrium. A
bimatrix entry (c′, h′) corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium if c′ is a max-
imum in the C-component of the column of (c′, h′), and h′ is a maximum in
theH-component of the row of (c′, h′). Similarly, a profile of mixed strategies
(P ′,Q′) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if
P ′CQ′T = max
P
PCQ′T and P ′HQ′T = max
Q
P ′HQT .
The first equation says that P ′ is a best response to Q′, that is P ′ maxi-
mizes Contestant’s expected payoff when the opponent plays Q′. The second
equation says that Q′ is a best response to P ′. A general theorem due to
John Nash ensures that at least one such Nash equilibrium exists.
In every Nash equilibrium Contestant will have the winning probability
not less than her minimax value V = 2/3. Higher chance might be possible,
unless the game is strictly antagonistic.
3.1 Some examples
The examples of game matrices to follow are designed for the sake of instruc-
tion, and do not pretend to any degree of realism.
(α) Sympathetic Host is modelled by the bimatrix H = C (that is h ≡ c).
Every entry (1, 1) corresponds then to a pure Nash equilibrium.
(β) Indifferent Host has payoff matrix with identical entries, for instance
h ≡ 0. Every Host’s strategy Q and best Contestant’s response P ′ =
P ′(Q) to Q make up a Nash equilibrium.
(γ) Maverick Host with such payoff might want to disprove the advantage
of Switch action:
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1L 1R 2L 2R 3L 3R
1SS (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, -1) (1, -1) (1, -1) (1, -1)
1SN (0, 0) (1, -1 ) (0, 0 ) (0, 0 ) (1, -1 ) (1, -1)
1NS (1, 4) (0, 4) (1, 3) (1, 3) (0, 2) (0, 2)
1NN (1, 5) (1, 4) (0, 3) (0, 3) (0, 2) (0, 2)
2SS (1, -1) (1, -1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, -1) (1, -1)
The remaining rows are completed by requiring exchangeability among
the doors.
Observe that both profiles (1NS,1L) and (1NN,1L) are pure Nash equi-
libria with distinct payoff profiles (1,5) and (1,4), respectively. This
contrasts with zero-sum games, where all minimax solutions result in
the same payoff (the value of the game).
Naturally, Host would prefer outcome (1,5) to (1,4), but he has no
means to force Contestant playing 1NN in place of 1NS even though
she will have no disadvantage. Paradoxes of this kind, congenial with
the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma, are inherent to the noncooperative
games.
Among Contestant’s strategies, rows 1NS and 1NN are dominated, but
discarding them we lose two Nash equilibria, one of which entails for
Host the highest possible payoff.
(δ) Antagonistic and superstitious Host. Suppose Host loses a point when
the car is won, and loses another point for opening Right door in case
of match:
1L 1R 2L 2R 3L 3R
1SS (0, 0) (0, -1) (1, -1) (1, -1) (1, -1) (1, -1)
1SN (0, 0) (1, -2 ) (0, 0 ) (0, 0) (1, -1) (1, -1)
1NS (1, -1) (0, -1) (1, -1) (1, -1) (0, 0) (0, 0)
1NN (1, -1) (1, -2) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
2SS (1, -1) (1, -1) (0, 0) (0, -1) (1, -1) (1, -1)
(the matrix is completed by requiring the exchangeability of doors).
Columns XR are dominated in the H-component and can be removed
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without loss of Nash equilibria. Removing the columns we reduce to
a zero-sum game whose unique solution is (P ∗,Q∗
1,1,1) already encoun-
tered in Section 2.3.
3.2 Best responses
In a Nash equilibrium (P ′,Q′), strategy P ′ is a best response to Q′. This
feature and the dominance are the keys to the question in the epigram to
this paper.
Proposition Suppose Host uses strategy Q according to which the car is
hidden behind door X with probability piX , for X = 1, 2, 3. Then every Con-
testant’s best response to Q yields the winning probability 1−min(pi1, pi2, pi3).
The proof of proposition is straightforward by dominance. Discarding
dominated pure strategies does not diminish the winning chance in the com-
bat with Q. We are left with Y SS, and the comparison of probabilities 1−piY
for Y = 1, 2, 3 is in favor of the minimizer of pi1, pi2, pi3.
We stress that probability piX is the cumulative probability of strategies
XL and XR. The behavior of Host when he has a freedom of the second
action can be arbitrary.
To appreciate the method based on dominance, the reader may consult
other approaches. Tijms (see [10], p. 217, problem 6.4) suggests to set up a
chance tree, and Rosenhouse (see [8], Section 3.10) shows calculations with
conditional probabilities; in both references the assumption that the second
choice of Host occurs by unbiased coin-flipping is taken for granted.
Recall strategy Q∗
1,1,1 which has preference to Left door. One best re-
sponse to this is the (unique) minimax strategy P ∗. Another best response
is the uniform mixture of 1NS, 2NS and 3NS, according to which Contestant
chooses X uniformly and then plays Switch only if Right door is revealed.
Let us inspect conditions under which a best response strategy avoids
Notswitch action. To ease notation suppose pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ pi3. Excluding the
trivial case pi3 = 0, we assume pi3 > 0. Strategies YNN are not included in
any best response to Q, because they only achieve piY < 1 − pi3. For other
dominated pure strategies there is a simple exclusion rule: for X = 1, 2, 3
(I) if XL enters Q with nonzero probability then every best response ex-
cludes XSN,
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(II) if XR enters Q with nonzero probability then every best response ex-
cludes XNS.
The rules are derived in the same way we used to show the uniqueness of
minimax strategy P ∗ in Section 2.4, from the patterns of C like
1L 1R 2L 2R 3L 3R
1SS 0 0 1 1 1 1
2SN 0 0 0 1 1 1
Looking at best response to a fully supported strategy we conclude:
Theorem Suppose in some Nash equilibrium (P ′,Q′) Host uses a strategy
Q′ which gives nonzero probabilities to each of the admissible actions 1L, 1R,
2L, 2R, 3L, 3R. Then P ′ is a mixture of strategies 1SS, 2SS, 3SS, which do
not employ action Notswitch.
More precisely, assuming pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ pi3 for the probabilities of X = 1, 2, 3 we
have
(1) If pi1 ≥ pi2 > pi3 ≥ 0 then P
′ is the pure strategy 3SS.
(2) If pi1 > pi2 = pi3 ≥ 0 then P
′ is a mixture of 2SS, 3SS.
(3) If pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 1/3 then P
′ is the uniform mixture of 1SS, 2SS, 3SS.
Finally, we shall draw some conclusions about Host’s preferences when
payoff matrix H admits Nash equilibrium (P ′,Q′) with fully suported Q′.
From the fact that Q′ is a best response to P ′ follows that P ′ equalizes
all strategies of Host. That is to say, when Contestant plays P ′ Host is
indifferent which strategy to play, since the payoff P ′HQ is the same for all
Q. In case (1) this is only possible if row 3SS of H has equal entries. In
case (2) a mixture of rows 2SS and 3SS of H is a row with equal entries. In
case (3) the equilibrium strategies are as in the zero-sum game, whence the
average of rows 1SS, 2SS, 3SS of H must be a row with equal entries.
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